Constitutional Crisis
Over the Proposed Supreme Court for the United Kingdom
Peter L. Fitzgerald*
Although relatively little noticed on this side of the Atlantic, the United Kingdom is in
the midst of a constitutional crisis over proposals to reform the judiciary and to establish
a Supreme Court for the first time in their history. Resulting primarily from long standing
debates over how best to “modernize” ancient British institutions and practices, these
reforms are also influenced by the immediate and serious practical pressures facing any
government grappling with global threats to national security. Accordingly, the debate in
the U.K. has important implications for all democratic governments seeking to uphold
“the rule of law” and preserve liberty in the face of international terrorism.

THE INTRODUCTION OF PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Prime Minister Tony Blair stunned the British legal community on June 12, 2003, by
announcing the creation of a Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, the abolition of the
office of Lord Chancellor, and an entirely new approach to selecting the country’s
judiciary.1 These changes are aimed at separating the British judiciary from the executive
and legislative functions of government, and incorporate proposals that had generally
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been part of the Labour Party agenda since coming into office in 1997.2 Nevertheless, the
announcement of these constitutional reforms actually came as an unexpected part of a
relatively routine mid-term cabinet reshuffle. In effect, Blair attempted to sweep away
1400 years of British constitutional history and significantly alter the country’s unwritten
constitutional conventions with a press release.3

While the British typically regard the ability to evolve and adapt to new circumstances
over time as one of its principal strengths of their unwritten constitution, when compared
to the more rigid structure and amendment process of a written constitution such as that
found in the United States for example, announcing major constitutional reforms in this
fashion was seen by many within and without the judiciary as ill-considered at best.
Following upon various government sponsored legislative acts that incorporated the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
into British domestic law,4 devolved greater legislative and executive authority to
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales,5and removed the right of most hereditary peers to
sit in the House of Lords,6 the government’s announcement greatly surprised the
Conservative opposition and many others. Characterized as a “ragbag”7 of proposals and
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“yet another trendy constitutional upheaval worked out on the back of an envelope,
hopelessly ill-thought through,”8 these latest reforms were severely criticized for being
handled in a manner that was “a bit of a shambles”.9 Others also noted that “even the best
friends of this proposal might have hoped for a better start for it”.10

Lord Irvine of Lairg’ s immediate resignation and tributes to his role as the “last Lord
Chancellor” following the Prime Minister’s announcement,11 combined with the
appointment in his stead of Lord Falconer of Thoroton to the newly created post of
Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs,12 created an initial impression that these
changes were a fait accompli. However, even with an unwritten constitution, the process
of change is more complex than simply issuing a press statement. As subsequently
clarified,13 that process involves a government consultation paper, soliciting public
comments,14 and culminates with the passage of implementing legislation in Parliament.
During this time Lord Falconer serves as Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs,
while also wearing the Lord Chancellor’s wig and robe, as he shephe rds the reforms
through Parliament.15 Accordingly, the Constitutional Reform Bill may have started “on
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the back of an envelope,” but as introduced in the House of Lords on February 24, 2004,
it actually runs more than 200 pages.16

The abolition of the post of Lord Chancellor, a position that dates to 605 and precedes the
establishment of Parliament by several centuries, is the keystone of the Bill and the
government’s proposals for reform.17 Historically, the Lord High Chancellor and Keeper
of the Great Seal of the Realm acted as the sovereign’s secretary and chief
administrator.18 As a key figure in the Royal Council, the Lord Chancellor was also
responsible for the courts of equity, and later presided over Parliament when the monarch
was unavailable or absent.19 Today, as a result of the nineteenth century merger of the
courts of law and equity, the Lord Chancellor serves as the head of the judiciaryfor
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, in addition to chairing the Appellate Committee of
the House of Lords and presiding over the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; sits
as Speaker in the House of Lords; and is the senior government official responsible for
the administration of the courts, and is specifically assigned various responsibilities in
nearly 700 separate statutory references.20 Thus, the Lord Chancellor simultaneously
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serves as a judge, parliamentarian, and government minister, and it is this multiplicity of
roles which the Constitutional Reform Bill endeavors to untangle.21

The Bill does so by abolishing this ancient office, which has been held by figures such as
Thomas Becket, Sir Thomas More, and Cardinal Wolsey,22 and reallocating the Lord
Chancellor’s various responsibilities. The Bill would assign the Lord Chancellor’s
ministerial or executive functions for the court system to theSecretary of State for
Constitutional Affairs who will neither act as a judge nor sit on any body in a judicial
capacity.23 In a related provision, the Lord Chief Justice is given new authority as the
President of the Courts of England and Wales for representing the interests of the
judiciary to Parliament and the Secretary of State.24 The Secretary, and all other
government ministers, are also subject to a new statutory obligation to respect and
safeguard the continued independence of the judiciary.25 A further measure designed to
bolster the independence of the judiciary from political influence is the transfer of the
Lord Chancellor’s power to nominate and appoint judges for England and Wales to the
Secretary, acting upon the recommendations of an independent Judicial Appointments
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Commission.26 With regard to the Lord Chancellor’s parliamentary role, the Speaker of
the House of Lords will be made independent of the executive and the position filled in a
manner to be determined by the Lords themselves.27 Lastly, Parliament’s judicial
function, as exercised by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, is transferred to a new Supreme Court for the United
Kingdom, thereby separating the legislature from the judiciary for the first time in
Parliament’s history.28

Irrespective of the merit of these proposals, the manner in which the government
announced the reforms and its intent to push the matter to a conclusion in the current
session of Parliament continues to have serious repercussions. Opponents of the reform
package, including many of the senior members of the judiciary, strenuously assert that
the proposals are not well thought out, and that more time is needed to study and
understand their implications – an argument that is perhaps bolstered by the special role
that a complex mix of practice, convention, and tradition plays in delineating the
legitimate scope of authority for the various branches of government when constitutional
checks and balances are not specifically enumerated in a written constitution.29
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In a highly unusual move, the House of Lords voted by a substantial margin to send the
government’s Constitutional Reform Bill to a select committee, a parliamentary tactic
used to block further consideration of proposed legislation employed only once before in
modern times.30 In response, the government apparently considered withdrawing the bill
from the House of Lords, reintroducing it into the House of Commons, and eventually
seeking its passage over the Lord’s objection under the authority of the Parliament Acts,31
which prevents the House of Lords from blocking legislation in two consecutive sessions
of Parliament.32 Although a less confrontational approach won out, the attitudes and
comments revealed during this parliamentary maneuvering are particularly telling.

While the judiciary and the House of Lords criticized the government for proceeding with
major constitutional changes with insufficient preparation or thought, they were in turn
accused of attacking the government’s Bill, at least in part, because they oppose the
Labour government’s plans to abolish the remaining hereditary peers, resulting in an
upper house that is entirely appointed.33 Peter Hain, the Labour party Leader of the House
of Commons, declared that by referring the Bill to a select committee what the "peers are
proposing is completely undemocratic…We cannot allow it to happen. Peers are being
incited by Michael Howard [the leader of the Conservative Party] to overturn the will of
the elected chamber….That is absolutely undemocratic and we cannot allow it to
happen."34 Lord Falconer also said that he feared that referring the Bill to a select
30
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committee would mean that the “elected chamber” would not get a chance to consider it
in the current session.35 Baroness Amos, the Labour leader in the House of Lords voiced
a similar opinion after the vote to refer the Bill to the select committee passed, saying,
“[b]y this vote, this House - the unelected House [of Lords] - has made it impossible for
the democratically elected House of Commons to receive this Bill, promised in the
Queen's Speech in November, in time to consider it this session. That is very serious
indeed."36 Ultimately, however, the government and Lords agreed to continue with the
current bill on the understanding that the select committee would consider the reform
proposals expeditiously and that, if necessary, the Bill could be carried over into the next
Parliamentary session in time to still pass before the next general election in 2005.37 “It
is a compromise but we will get our Bill” according to at least one government minister.38

THE REASONS FOR CHANGE

Complaining that the Lords are frustrating the will of the people’s elected representatives
shows a lack of appreciation of the role of the second chamber in providing political
balance in a system in which the government is formed by the party that controls the
House of Commons – or at least a latent desire for a unicameral legislature. Moreover,
given the focus of this particular Bill, it also suggests a lack of understanding of the
judiciary’s traditional role in legally limiting the power of the majority in governmental
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systems characterized by a greater separation of powers than historically has been the
case in the United Kingdom.

In Britain, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty limits the courts’ authority or
willingness to overturn legislation, but these limits on judicial review are counterbalanced
by the presence of the Law Lords in the legislature and by the judicial functions exercised
by Parliament in the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and in the Privy
Council. It is actually the different approach British courts take towards judicial review
that fundamentally distinguishes the legal system in the United Kingdom from that in the
United States, rather than a reliance upon unwritten or written constitutional provisions.
The ability of the courts in the United States to declare legislative or executive actions
illegal is, after all, itself a creature of caselaw – and based upon Justice Marshall’s 1803
decision in Marbury v. Madison rather than the text of the U.S. Constitution itself.
Moreover, Marshall’s conception of judicial review is inherently undemocratic, and
highlights the courts’ role in protecting individual interests from the will of the majority
as part of a system characterized by a strong separation of governmental powers.

The Constitutional Reform Bill, and many of the other constitutional reforms instituted
byBlair’s “New Labour” government in the name of modernization, arguably reflect a
desire for greater executive authority and freedom from the checks and balances imposed
by the structure and conventions of the British constitutional system. The irony of the
current proposal is that by throwing away long established constitutional practices,
conventions, and institutions, the government may well be setting the stage for a greater
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role for judicial review in the British system. Rather than simply providing greater
flexibility to government, establishing a Supreme Court and enhancing the separation of
the judiciary from Parliament might result in the substitution of new more legalistic limits
on executive and legislative authority, replacing the traditional British reliance upon
essentially political controls to ensure the responsible exercise of governmental power.

Two different motivations appear to be causing the Blairgovernment to pursue these
changes: one based upon longstanding debates over constitutional principle and theory –
whether Locke’s or Montesquieu’s view of government should prevail over that of
Austin, Bentham, and Hobbes39 – and the other prompted by the much more prosaic and
practical needs of a government fighting an international war on terrorism in the post
9/11 world.

From the perspective of constitutional theory, the traditional British system of legislative
sovereignty has its ideological roots in the authoritarian view of the social contract
espoused by Thomas Hobbes, whereas the separation of powers doctrine at the heart of
the U.S. legal system emphasizes equal and semi-autonomous authorities derived from
John Locke’s conception of natural law and restricted governmental power.40 Very
different roles for the judiciary, and different methods for protecting individual liberty,
resulted from these contrasting approaches to the nature of government and the source of
sovereign power.41
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When describing the English legal system in his Commentaries in the 18th century,
Blackstone hypothesized “there is and must be in all [states] a supreme, irresistible,
absolute, uncontrolled authority”; and this authority is “the natural, inherent right that
belongs to the sovereignty of the state . . . of making and enforcing laws”.42 “All other
powers of the state . . . in the execution of their several functions,” have to conform to
this inherent law-making power, “or else the Constitution is at an end.”43 Parliament – the
aggregate body of the Crown, Lords, and Commons – is the law making power in
Britain. Therefore, it is in Parliament that the “absolute despotic power” called
sovereignty resides.44 As a consequence, Blackstone reasons that judicial review is
necessarily limited:
I know that it is generally laid down…that acts of Parliament contrary to reason
are void. But if the Parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is
unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it; and the examples usually
alledged in support of this sense of the rule do none of them prove, that where the
main object of a statute is unreasonable the judges are at liberty to reject it; for
that were to set the judicial power above the legislative, which would be
subversive of all government.45
Thus, the British judiciary are confined to applying and interpreting the laws passed by
Parliament, rather than ruling on their constitutional legality. As Professor Dicey noted in
the late 19th century, in English history Parliament was the traditional protector of
individual rights, and the guarantor of the independence of the judiciary, against
overreaching authority of the monarch. According to Dicey’s classic formulation of the
42
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doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament alone has, “the right to make or
unmake any law whatever; and further…no person or body is recognized…as having a
right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”46

So in the United Kingdom:
the Crown remains the source of governmental authority. Sovereignty rests in the
Crown in Parliament. The popular will is expressed through the representative
institution of Parliament, and the popular or democratic control is exercised
through the ballot box . . . . The Crown is controlled by Parliament, the Crown in
general being confined to advisors who have the confidence of Parliament. The
judiciary, appointed by the executive under Parliamentary authority, is to resolve
contests between subjects, or between subjects and the executive, according to the
law, unwritten or statutory.
In…contrast…when the American colonies cut the umbilical cord and secured the
Treaty of Paris, the people were postulated as the source of power and authority.
The representative institutions of government, President and Congress, were
denied sovereignty which resided with the people. These institutions operate in
government, as it were, by delegation. As a result of American history, the
judiciary came to occupy the position of an arbiter between government, and
the people, ensuring that rights, natural or human rights, over which power had
not been delegated or which was held not to have been delegated, were not
infringed by legislative or executive action. If to this situation is added the
American Bill of Rights, the difference in judicial traditions is both apparent and
explained.47

Accordingly, in the U.K. there is neither a separate constitutional court, as found in many
civil law systems, nor an “American style” supreme court with the power to overturn
legislation. Instead, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords hears criminal and
civil appeals from the courts in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and civil (but not
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criminal) appeals from Scotland.48 The twelve Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, also known
as the “Law Lords,” perform the judicial function of the House of Lords pursuant to the
Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876, as well as being full members of the House of Lords
and life peers.49 Additionally, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the House
of Lords handles questions concerning devolution, that is, whether the Scottish
Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Assembly, are
acting within the proper scope of their respective authority, along with certain appeals
from Commonwealth countries.50 Established pursuant to the Judicial Committee Act of
1833, the Judicial Committee is comprised of the Law Lords, and numerous Privy
Councillors, although it is nevertheless separate and distinct from the Appellate
Committee with its own jurisdiction.51 The multiple roles performed by the Lord
Chancellor – as the presiding officer on these judicial committees, speaker of the upper
house, and member of the government’s cabinet – are a key part of this system, and
helped to make the British constitutional structure work as the demands made upon the
Crown and government evolved over time.52 In essence, one of the reasons that the
British constitutional structure has been so successful in adapting to changing
circumstances over times is because of the absence of a formalseparation of powers,
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combined with a powerful traditional culture of mutual respect, restraint, and cooperation
among the various arms of government.53

Despite its demonstrated historical success, questions nevertheless arise concerning the
actual or perceived independence of the judiciary under this structure.54 Given the
importance now placed on a more strict separation of powers in modern times –
especially with regard to the various emerging democracies – the current constitutional
structure in United Kingdom has been increasingly criticized. For example, even though
the U.K. is widely recognized as one of the world’s oldest democracies, an original
signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and a founding
member of the Council of Europe, the compatibility of the British constitutional system
with terms of the ECHR is not entirely clear. In September of last year, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a resolution expressing its concern over
Britain’s compliance with the right to a fair trial by independent and impartial tribunals as
guaranteed by Article 6 of the ECHR, and specifically endorsed the need for the
constitutional reforms proposed by the Labour government.55 Although this concern may
perhaps be mitigated by the Law Lords’ practice of generally refraining from party
political debate in Parliament, or recusing themselves from judicialmatters when they
have actually participated in debate,56 the Council felt it “essential that even in the
absence of concrete challenges, the judiciary should be seen as independent both by
53
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[those in the U.K.] and by fellow European countries.”57 Indeed, the European Court of
Human Rights held in McGonnell v United Kingdom, thatthere was an apparent (though
not actual) lack of impartiality when the Bailiff of Guernsey sat in judgment on a case
involving legislation that he participated in passing.58 The Court of Session in Scotland
similarly held in Starrs v Procurator Fiscal, Linlithgow thatthe executive’s systematic
reliance on temporary judges who could be discharged at any time without challenge or
explanation was inconsistent with an independent judiciary and the right to an impartial
trial under the ECHR.59

The Council’s resolution and these cases reflect an evolving notion that judicial
independence and impartiality must be measured by both subjective and objective
standards. As the European Court of Human Rights stated in Findlay v. United Kingdom,
a “tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias [and] it must also be
impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is it must offer sufficient guarantees to
exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.”60 Beyond the need to objectively
demonstrate independence and impartiality within the British judicialsystem, however,
the Council of Europe’s resolution also reflected a concern among the other forty
members with written constitutions thatthe situation in the U.K. “may … cause
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confusion, or be abused, in the new member countries.” 61 As the countries comprising
the Council, including the U.K., are “repeatedly stressing the judiciary should be a
completely independent branch of government” there is a political desire to avoid being
seen as directing newly emerging democracies to “do as I say and not as I do”.62

Thus, the push for reform is not really driven so much by a need to significantly alter an
already well-regarded constitutional system, but rather to update intergovernmental
relationships regulated by practice, convention, and informal – largely political – checks
and balances, with more defined structures in order to increase confidence in the British
constitutional system in line with modern understandings of basic governmental
principles. In this sense, the Constitutional Reform Billis really just the latest iteration of
a largely theoretical debate running since at least the 1970s.63

The second, more immediate and political, motivation for reform is a desire for greater
executive and legislative flexibility as the demands for government services increase,
particularly with the need to address the recent rise of global threats such as international
terrorism. The way the executive and legislative authority evolves and responds to these
pressures poses important practical and pragmatic questions as to how government
should operate in the 21st century. However, the British judiciary and common law also
continues to evolve in the face of these and other new challenges – for example, to
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address the growth of modern administrative bureaucracy created by executive and
legislative action, and to adapt to a world characterized by a multiplicity of different type
and sources of law and regulation. Accordingly, if the constitutional balance among the
various functions of government in the United Kingdom that was gradually established
over many years of incremental change is now to be radically adjusted, as with the
Constitutional Reform Bill, the ultimate impact of the proposed reforms may not be
entirely predictable – particularly with regard to the scope of judicial review practiced in
the United Kingdom.64

THE PROSPECTS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER A REVISED BRITISH
CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT

Notwithstanding the theoretical neutrality and subservience of the courts to Parliament as
enunciated by Dicey, the British courts are increasingly prone to exercise their powers to
interpret law in creative ways that are starting to look remarkably like what Justice
Marshall would recognize as judicial review – especially when it is recalled that Marshall
articulated but declined to exercise that power in Marbury. Historically, judicial review in
the U.K. was confined to restraining the exercise of executive or administrative discretion
in excess of the authority granted by legislation. However, even this limited form of
review grew dramatically with the expansion of government throughout the late 20th
century, from a mere 160 cases in 1974 to more than 4,000 in the 1990s.65 Moreover,
Parliament itself has encouraged – and sometime directed – that the courts engage in a
broader form of review. Lord Denning spoke of the impact of the “incoming tide” of a
64
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different – European style – law following the U.K.’s joining the Common Market,66
which effectively helped the judiciary to reshape British law to meet European
obligations in accord with the European Communities Act of 1972,67 a trend which
presumably will only increase if and when the draft European Constitution is adopted.68
More recently, devolution of a varying degree of legislative authority to Northern Irish,
Scottish, and Welsh regional assemblies, and perhaps even more importantly the Human
Rights Act of 1998 (HRA),69 provide the courts with new powers not only to interpret
legislation but to rule on its legality.70

The HRA was one of the first major constitutional reforms instituted by the Labour party
after it returned to power following nearly twenty years of Conservative government. The
Act purports to formally bring the European Convention on Human Rights into U.K.
domestic law although, as Britain was a major architect of the ECHR, many of the
Convention’s substantive provisions appear at first glance simply to be a codification of
common law principles.71 That view prevailed in the initial years following drafting and
signature of the Convention in 1950, and therefore there was no immediate perceived
need to expressly incorporate the international obligations of the ECHR into British law,
although it was nevertheless cited in hundreds of domestic cases as an aid to the courts in
66
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71
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interpreting domestic law.72 However, following the British acceptance of an individual
right of petition to Strasbourg in 1966, the U.K. lost more than fifty cases – particularly
with regard to measures it took to address terrorism in Ireland.73 The fact that European
judges were interpreting and applying the Convention in ways that differed from what
British judges might do – and declaring Parliament’s legislation illegal – greatly added to
the pressure to “bring the Convention home” and to authorize domestic courts to apply
the ECHR directly.74

Previous attempts to do so had floundered in the face of the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, and the question of how to entrench fundamental rights against their repeal
or derogation by the actions of a subsequent, sovereign, Parliament.75 The HRA
essentially ignores the entrenchment issue, and was passed as an ordinary piece of
legislation. It simply relies upon a responsible government and legislature to respect the
intent and importance of the fundamental rights listed in the Convention and that are
made part of domestic law by the Act. In other words, the Labour government took a
classically pragmatic British approach to the tough conceptual legal problem posed by
parliamentary sovereignty. Lord Irvine of Lairg, the then Lord Chancellor, did so by
essentially ensuring that the Act was not seen as a direct assault upon Parliament’s
traditional sovereign role.
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The HRA directs that courts and other tribunals are to take the Convention rights and
related European decisions into account when rendering their judgments,76 but they are
also directed to construe legislative and public acts as compatible with the ECHR
whenever feasible.77 Only in the rare instances when that is clearly not possible, may the
court make a “declaration of incompatibility”78 and award other appropriate relief,
including compensation.79 Significantly, however, the declaration does not affect the
validity, continuing operation, or enforcement of the offending measure.80 The
government or Parliament, rather than the courts, must decide whether or not to act to
resolve the issue with a remedial order.81 Additional provisions in the HRA preserved the
U.K.’s preexisting derogations to the ECHR relating to the Prevention of Terrorism Acts
and Orders, and the Education Acts, and the ability to modify these or take similar
actions in the future82 – which subsequently became necessary with the Terrorism Act of
200083 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act of 2001.84

76

Human Rights Act 1998, 1998, Chapter 42, §2, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#2.
Id. at §3, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#3; §6,
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#6.
78
Id. at §4, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#4.
79
Id. at §8, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#8.
80
Id. at §4(6), http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#4.
81
Id. at §10, http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--a.htm#4; and Schedule 2,
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--g.htm#sch2.
82
Id. at §§14-17, http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--b.htm#14; and Schedule 3,
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80042--h.htm#sch3.
83
See, Terrorism Act 2000, 2000 Chapter 11,
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000011.htm; and The Human Rights Act
(Amendment) Order 2001, Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 1216,
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20011216.htm.
84
See, Anti-Terrorism, Crime & Security Act 2001, 2001 Chapter 24,
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm; The Human Rights Act 1998
(Designated Derogation) Order 2001, Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 3644,
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20013644.htm; and The Human Rights Act 1998
(Amendment No. 2) Order 2001, Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 4032,
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20014032.htm.
77

20

Thus, the HRA affirmatively directs the courts to apply the ECHR and related European
law, while at the same time attempting to preserve Parliament’s preeminent role in the
British constitutional system. When the executive makes a bad decision, it is sent back to
the government for review; similarly when Parliament passes a bad law, Parliament must
decide what to do. Nevertheless, some commentators suggest that in reality the Act, by
making government and public bodies more accountable, “represents an unprecedented
transfer of political power from the executive and legislature to the judiciary, and a
fundamental restructuring of [Britain’s] political constitution.” 85 The result, in a classic
illustration of the law of unintended consequences, was a dramatic increase in tension
between the Blair government, that made passage of the HRA a major part of its party
manifesto during the 1997 election, and the judiciary.

The always tense relationship between the judiciary and the Home Office, a government
ministry with responsibilities roughly akin to the Department of Homeland Security and
the Department of Justice in the U.S.,86 became particularly contentious in the aftermath
of the 9/11 attacks. The Ministry’s attempts to curtail the use of juries in criminal cases,87
permit the Home Secretary to impose harsher minimum sentences than recommended by
the courts in certain cases,88 limit the rights of immigrants or asylum seekers,89 and
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provide for the indefinite detention without trial ofsuspected foreign national terrorists ,90
were all rebuffed by the courts or the House of Lords.

The Home Secretary, David Blunkett, is reportedly incensed and “fed up with having to
deal with a situation where Parliament debates issues and the judges overturn them”.91
While acknowledging the “right of judges to challenge [the government] when we step
outside what parliament lays down,” Blunkett says, “what [he doesn’t] “understand is the
assertion…that somehow there is the right of judges to be engaged in perpetually
checking and overturning processes [of] a democratically elected parliament…The judges
are saying that they want to remain in the political debate. They are opposed to us
removing them from the House of Lords.”92 Moreover, Blunket believes, "[t]hey want a
supreme court which has the right to overturn the will of Parliament."93 Known as a plain
spoken and populist Home Secretary, Blunket also demonstrated his frustration with the
judiciary when he asked, “[t]he question is do we have a democracy where parliament
makes the decisions and if it gets them wrong overturns them? …Or do we have a
democracy where we say ‘You can go so far, but the real democracy is in the judiciary’
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and they should not only want to sit in parliament…they should also be able to override
parliament?”94

Some commentators suggest that Blunkett’s exasperation with an increasingly
independent judiciary unafraid to use their powers under the HRA was responsible, in
part, for the Blair government’s seemingly precipitous attempt to abolish the Lord
Chancellor’s Office and the announcement of the related reform proposals in June,
2003.95 Lord Hattersley, a Labour party politician from 1958 to 1997 who served in many
posts including that of Shadow Home Secretary,96 wrote that “[n]o Home Secretary in
living memory…has a worse record for attempting to interfere with the judicial process.
Arrogance has combined with populism to make Blunkett attack every judgment with
which he disagrees.”97 Accordingly, as a defender of the judiciary and the HRA, Lord
Irvine’s retort to the Home Secretary’s being “fed up” with judges – made shortly before
the issuance of the press release announcing the government’s constitutional reforms –
that “maturity requires that when you get a decision that favours you, you do not clap
[a]nd when you get one that goes against you, you don’t boo,” probably did not help his
position in the rough and tumble of British politics, and arguably contributed to the move
to abolish the office of Lord Chancellor.98
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The desire for more unfettered governmental authority, combined with a greater need to
protect one’s borders from foreign threats, also led tothe inclusion of a specific judicial
ouster clause in the government’s Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants,
etc.) Bill.99 Introduced at about the same time as the Constitutional Reform Bill, the
Asylum Bill brought the clash with the judiciary and the House of Lords to a head. The
Asylum Bill amends the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002100 to create a
new unified system of administrative tribunals to handle appeals. Simultaneously,
however, it precludes any further appeal from these administrative tribunals to the
courts,101 even though the 2002 Act instituted an expedited judicial review process
designed to reduce the problem of excessive or abusive appeals that occurred under prior
law.102 This prompted one MP commenting on the new Asylum Bill to quip that "[i]t is
indeed a novel principle of dealing with an abuse of process by removing the process
rather than the abuse."103

The Asylum Bill broadly declares that “[n]o court shall have any supervisory or other
jurisdiction (whether statutory or inherent) in relation to the Tribunal,” along with
extensive additional provisions specifically aimed at limiting judicial review under both
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existing caselaw and under the HRA.104 As such, this provision embodies the essence of
the Home Secretary’s concerns over the judicial role, and became the focal point of the
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faith.
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judiciary’s and House of Lord’s efforts to preserve the application of the rule of law to
government.105

Judicial ouster clauses are, of course, not new.106 Nor are British judges reluctant to use
their interpretative powers to mitigate or eliminate the impact of such clauses whenever
possible.107 What is significant in this Bill, however, is the breadth and extent of the
ouster. By drafting an exceptionally comprehensive ouster provision, the fundamental
issue of whether the judiciary would continue to accept the classic formulation of the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, or possibly actto overrule Parliament’s attempt to
deny access to the courts as a violation of the rule of law, was squarely presented.

(4) A court may consider whether a member of the Tribunal has acted in bad faith, in
reliance on subsection (3)(b)(iii), only if satisfied that significant evidence has been
adduced of—
(a) dishonesty,
(b) corruption, or
(c) bias.
(5) Section 7(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) (claim that public authority has
infringed Convention right) is subject to subsections (1) to (3) above.
(6) Nothing in this section shall prevent an appeal under section 2, 2B or 7 of the
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68) (appeals to and from
Commission).
(7) In this section “action” includes failure to act.”
It should also be noted, however, that prior to passage of the Bill by the House of Commons, the
Committee on Constitutional Affairs stated it believed that the judicial ouster provision in the Asylum Bill
was “without precedent” and that “as a matter of constitutional principle some form of higher judicial
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As a result of the continuing evolution of the common law, as well as being encouraged
to be more active by Parliament’s own legislation, the courts in recent years increasingly
recognized thatcertain fundamental rights have constitutional import within the British
system.108 Were Parliament to unambiguously contravene those rights, courts might
conceivably refuse to enforce such a law notwithstanding the traditional strictures of
parliamentary sovereignty. As Lord Chief Justice Woolf stated in his 1994 F.A. Mann
Lecture, this is simply:

…a proper recognition of … the equal responsibility that Parliament and the
courts are under to respect the other’s burden’s and play the proper role in
upholding the rule of law. I see the courts and Parliament as being partners both
engaged in a common enterprise…
There are however situations where…in upholding the rule of law, the courts have
had to take a stand. The example which springs to mind is the Anisminiccase. 109
In that case even the statement in an Act of Parliament that the [Foreign
Compensation] Commission’s decision “shall not be called in question in any
court of law” did not succeed in excluding the jurisdiction of the court [to
examine whether the Commission was properly acting within the scope of
authority granted to it by Parliament]. Since that case Parliament has not again
mounted such a challenge to the reviewing power of the High Court. There has
been, and I am confident, there will continue to be, mutual respect for each
other’s roles
However, if Parliament did the unthinkable, then I would say that the courts
would also be required to act in a manner which would be without precedent.
Some judges might choose to do so by saying that it was an unrebuttable
presumption that Parliament could never intend such a result. I would myself
consider that there were advantages in making it clear that ultimately there are
even limits on the supremacy of Parliament which it is the courts’ inalienable
responsibility to identify and uphold. They are limits of the most modest
dimensions which I believe any democrat would accept. They are no more than
are necessary to enable the rule of law to be preserved.110
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Notwithstanding the confidence Lord Woolf expressed in political restraint and
responsible government, the “unthinkable” was under consideration in the government’s
Asylum Bill.

Since the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty matured not a single provision of primary
parliamentary legislation has been set aside by a British court, apart from cases where
Parliament effectively directed the courts to do so as in the European Communities Act or
the HRA.111 However, continued judicial deference to legislation also depends, as Lord
Woolf suggested in his lecture, upon Parliament observing the “principle of legality” and
upholding the rule of law. Lord Hoffmann pursued a similar theme in the House of Lords
decision in the Simms case where he stated that:

[p]arliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate
contrary to fundamental principles of human rights.…The constraints upon its
exercise by Parliament are ultimately political, not legal. But the principle of
legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept
the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or
ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full
implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the
democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication
to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words
were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the
courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of
Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which
exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a
constitutional document.112
Thus, while parliamentary sovereignty remains the key distinguishing feature of Britain’s
unwritten constitution, observance of the “rule of law” is itself recognized asa
fundamental constitutional principle derived from the common law and comprising part
111
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of the background against which parliamentary legislation may be measured. This latent
ability to engage in an examination of whether the other arms of government have abused
their power, which is broader than simply ensuring that Parliament’s legislative intent is
properly implemented, is inextricably intertwined with judicial enforcement of the rule of
law. Whether motivated by irrefutable presumptions against infringing fundamental
rights, or limited by the principle of legality, as ProfessorGeoffrey Wilson stated:

[n]obody should be surprised if in a real case of legislative enormity the courts did
not discover a higher principle of law by which they felt free or even obliged to
ignore the current version of the doctrine [of parliamentary sovereignty] not only
in the name of constitutional convention but also in the name of law.113
There is nothing in Britain’s unwritten constitutional settlement that mandates that the
courts continue to defer in all instances to the will of the government as expressed in
Parliament. Judicial deference, like the broader "American style" power of judicial
review, is the product of caselaw, history, and the judiciary's own conception of the
proper role of the courts. Just as the executive and legislative functions of government
continue to evolve in the face of new challenges and circumstances, so do the courts and
the common law – whether as a result of gradual processes or of a conscious and radical
transformation. Indeed, “the genius of the common law” is said to be “its capacity to
develop,”114 and in “the developing field of judicial review, it is usually unwise to say
‘never’.”115

In recent years several judges at different levels, while continuing to give all due
deference to Parliament, also articulated a basic belief that the judicial role in the British
113
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constitutional system needs to be respected.116 Although a broader notion of judicial
review is – as the Blair government notes – inherently undemocratic, it is also
fundamental to protecting society from an "elected dictatorship".117 As Lord Bridge
stated in the Morgan-Grampian case:
The maintenance of the rule of law is in every way as important in a free society
as the democratic franchise. In our society the rule of law rests upon twin
foundations: the sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament in making the law and
the sovereignty of the Queen’s courts in interpreting and applying the law.118
Lord Lester similarly noted that Parliament cannot be regarded as having an unchallenged
authority to "alter or destroy the essential features of the basic structure of the
constitution," and that if it attempts to do so the "courts will be available to decide these
graves issues for the first time for almost three centuries,"119 applying common law
principles to the British constitution in a manner already seen in Commonwealth cases
and in decisions appealed to the Privy Council.120 Lord Chief Justice Woolf went so far
as to say:
I am not over-dramatising the position if I indicate that, if this [ouster] clause
were to become law, it would be so inconsistent with the spirit of mutual respect
116
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between the different arms of government that it could be the catalyst for a
campaign for a written constitution. Immigration and asylum involve basic human
rights….The response of the government and the House of Lords to the chorus of
criticism of [the ouster clause] will produce the answer to the question of whether
our freedoms can be left in their hands under an unwritten constitution.121

Faced with an increasingly vociferous opposition from its most senior judges, as well as
many others, and the likelihood that the judiciary might employ what the Liberal
Democrat and Shadow Lord Chancellor, Lord Goodhart, called the "nuclear option" of
refusing to enforce Parliament's legislation,122 the government ultimately backed down.
Lord Falconer announced at the second reading of the Asylum Bill that the government
was withdrawing the ouster clause, and would work with the House of Lords to provide
for some sort of appeal mechanism to the courts in a revised version of the Asylum
Bill.123

This, however, is the background against which the Constitutional Reform Bill will be
considered, and the role of the proposed supreme court relative to the other arms of
government decided. The working assumption reflected in the Constitutional Reform Bill
is that the new supreme court, initially comprised of the existing Law Lords, will
essentially pick-up the judicial functions currently exercised by the House of Lords,
unchanged.124 Indeed, the portion of the Constitutional Reform Bill addressing the actual
operation of the proposed supreme court – as opposed to its selection, appointment,
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composition, and benefits – consists of but a single clause and schedule that simply
substitutes the new court for any references to the Appellate Committee or the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in prior legislation.125 However, if the traditional
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty applies, as a consequence of these reforms the new
court and its justices will be separated from, but effectively subordinate to, Parliament. In
Lord Chief Justice Woolf's words:
[a]mong Supreme Courts of the world, our [new] Supreme Court will, because of
its more limited role, be a poor relation. We will be exchanging a first class Final
Court of Appeal for a second class Supreme Court.126
The proposed legislation assumes that the status quo ante regarding the judicial role in
the British constitutional system will be maintained – but there is nothing in the Bill that
necessarily mandates that either the new supreme court or that the lower courts must
continue to view themselves as subservient to the will of Parliament. That view depends
upon a constitutional practice or convention, rather than a legal requirement, and is
ultimately enforced only by judicial acquiescence and adherence to precedent. As Lord
Woolf's comments imply, establishing a new supreme court as part of a set of reforms
aimed at providing greater separation among the executive, legislative, and judicial
functions of government makes the move towards claiming an enhanced power of
judicial review almost inevitable over time. Although this is not what Lord Woolf was
advocating, the alternative is for the courts to accept second class status in a new British
constitutional settlement, because the political balance among the various arms of
government will be radically realigned with these reforms.
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Were the Constitutional Reform Bill to be amended to try to legislatively prevent the
courts from modifying their traditional approach to their role or the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty, it would pose an issue similar to that raised by the Asylum
Bill. To the degree that a statement endorsing parliamentary sovereignty in the legislation
was regarded as reflecting current norms and merely precatory, it would probably be
regarded as much less egregious than the ouster clause, and largely unobjectionable. To
the degree that such a provision attempted to legally limit the courts' ability to develop or
enforce emerging common law notions of fundamental rights and freedoms, it comes
much closer to raising the problems associated with the Asylum Bill's ouster provision. In
either case, including such a provision in the Constitutional Reform Bill would also raise
many of the same difficult issues regarding entrenching one sovereign Parliament's acts
from modification or repeal by a subsequent sovereign Parliament that delayed the
various proposals to incorporate the ECHR into domestic British law for so many years.
Passage of the HRA as ordinary legislation suggests that entrenchment is an irresoluble
legal problem, or at least irresoluble so long as the courts adhere to the traditional view of
parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, were Parliament to attempt to legally prevent the courts
from taking a more expansive view of judicial review in an amended version of the Bill,
that attempt would fail if the judiciary were itself to decide that the broader reasons for
supporting their conventional acquiescence to parliamentary sovereignty – the
cooperation among the various arms of government to support the rule of law – no longer
applied.
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Lord Woolf also voiced additional practical political concerns over the courts' role in the
revised constitutional structure created as a result of the abolition of the Lord
Chancellor's Office. The Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, who the
government has stated in future years is likely to be a non-lawyer member of the House
of Commons, can reasonably be expected to face extraordinary demands from the Home
Office concerning its needs to address compelling criminal justice issues as well as the
ongoing war on terrorism, and Lord Woolf points to the Asylum Bill as an example of the
types of issues that might arise. His concern is that the Secretary of State might be less
well placed to protect the independence and interests of the judiciary and the unified
court system than was the Lord Chancellor under the old structure, and that the Home
Office might come to "dictate the agenda for the courts."127 If that indeed becomes the
case, it simultaneously provides both an example of the unintended political
consequences that might flow from these reforms, and a possible additional justification
for the judiciary to reassess its own role in the process in appropriate circumstances.

Accordingly, while many questions remain unanswered over the proposed supreme
court's jurisdiction – particularly with regard to whether giving the new court the ability
to hear appeals from Scotland is compatible with the 1707 Treaty of Union that created
the United Kingdom128 – it is unlikely that there will be any attempt to entrench or
mandate adherence to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as enunciated by
127
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Dicey.129 However, rearranging traditional British constitutional practices and
conventions as proposed in the Constitutional Reform Bill, combined with the ongoing
evolution of the common law and the judiciary's own view of their proper role, might
well prompt the development over time of a more activist approach to deciding
constitutional issues by the new supreme court and perhaps the lower courts.

CONCLUSION

Despite the means of the announcement, and the need for greater detail, the basic reforms
proposed by the Blair government in the Constitutional Reform Bill make sense.
Separating the judiciary from the executive and legislative arms of government has come
to be recognized as a basic principle to help ensure the safe distribution of power in
modern democracies. Accomplishing these reforms will remove a latent threat to the
independence of the judiciary, increase confidence in British institutions across the globe,
and bring the United Kingdom more into line with the current understanding of many of
its international obligations. Moreover, it will do so at a crucial time, when there is
unprecedented pressure to respond to new global threats in ways that might otherwise
impinge upon the basic freedoms which fundamentally characterize and distinguish
democratic governments – irrespective of whether those governments are based upon
written or unwritten constitutions.
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Even though Lord Woolf delayed his retirement to lead the attack on many aspects of the
government's proposals, 130 he publicly recognized that the reforms will and should go
through in some fashion; that the Lord Chancellor's position is no longer tenable in
modern times; that the judicial selection process needs fundamental reform; that the
independence of the judiciary needs statutory protection; and that too much currently
rests upon a foundation of "insecure conventions and understandings".131 The Queen
included these reforms in her annual opening speech to Parliament,132 and the
government is committed to passage of the Constitutional Reform Bill prior to the 2005
general election.133 Given the government's commitments, and the recognition of the need
for change even among the critics of the proposals, even though important details remain
unresolved – such as the costs associated with the court134 – the Constitutional reform
Bill will pass in some form. The ancient office of Lord Chancellor will be abolished or
radically transformed, and there will be a new Supreme Court for the United Kingdom.

Of all its various reforms put forth by this government, including the HRA, devolution,
and reform of House of Lords, the Constitutional Reform Bill represents the single most
fundamental and radical change in the British constitutional settlement in over three
hundred years. While not its primary object, the Bill will necessarily prompt a wider
debate on the question of whether Parliament or the British judiciary should decide
whether any given law passes constitutional muster. Judicial deference and unquestioned
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acceptance of parliamentary sovereignty is a product of the old constitutional settlement
in the United Kingdom. Given the conscious changes being pursued by the current
government in the name of modernization, the historical conventions, rationale, and
political balancing that made those doctrines suitable may no longer apply with the same
force. Accordingly, the result might well be a judiciary that is much more prone to
engage in the broader style of judicial review that parliamentary sovereignty effectively
curtailed. All that is needed is for a judge to decide, as John Marshall did when presented
with an appropriate case, that it is ultimately the rule of law thatis the paramount
principle underlying the restructured British constitutional settlement– something which
the judiciary in Great Britain appears to be increasingly willing to contemplate.

37

